The tenure arrangement of primary constitutional organ leaders is required as the implementation of power limitation principle and the manifestation of political equality principle as the characteristic of democratic state. The tenure arrangements of primary constitutional organ leaders in Indonesia have four models: tenure arrangement through the 1945 Constitution, tenure arrangement through Law, tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law but regulated in the constitutional organs' internal regulation, and tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law as well as internal regulation. The problem in this paper is: First, how is the arrangement of leadership tenure in the constitutional organs according to the Indonesian legislation system. Second, how to adjust the arrangement of constitutional organ leader in order to provide legal certainty and prevent conflict that can disrupt organs' performance. The arrangement through the Constitution is the most powerful model in term of legal certainty regarding that the Constitution is in the highest national legal order and materials related to the structure and organization of primary constitutional organs constitute the Constitution's substance. The model not regulated in law but regulated in internal regulation prone to cause conflict because every member of the constitutional organs which meets the requirements may change the internal regulation at any time. To avoid this conflict, this paper concludes that it requires the change of regulation regulating the tenure of constitutional organ leaders so that it is no longer regulated in the constitutional organs' internal regulations, but it is set in the 1945 Constitution or at least in the Law in order to have a better legal certainty.
Therefore, it becomes the authority of DPD members to determine DPD's code of conduct. Moreover, the limitation of leadership tenure from 5 years to 2.5 years is also required to evaluate leader's performance and make him focus on managing the institution. If it is too long, a leader can become complacent about the position.
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On the contrary, the party which does not agree with the tenure limitation from 5 years to 2.5 years argues this change is not taken in accordance with the constitutional practice stipulated in the Law No. 17/2014.
Then, the change of leadership tenure is false and unfounded regarding the election cycle and DPD membership period are applied mutatis mutandis towards the tenure of DPD leader, i.e. five years. It is also applied to the tenure of MPR leader, DPR leader, and DPRD leader.
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The conflict happens to DPD as a constitutional organ will have a certain implication to the effective implementation of its authorities and duties.
Moreover, the internal conflict on the limitation of leadership tenure can also affect the dignity and public confidence in DPD. The public confidence is not quite high before the conflict. It is based on the survey findings conducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) on 11-15 December 2015 showing only 53.4%.
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Internal conflict by the members of constitutional organs, including the leadership tenure, will greatly affect the performance and the goal achievement of constitutional organs. Jimly Asshiddiqie states that:
Institutional structure consists of people who hold their own position and role with different attitude and behavior. If the togetherness at work environment creates a traditional work culture, then the work climate and work relationship among the members will be mixed between personal and official matters. The stronger is the paternalistic and feudalistic culture in institutional structure, the stronger is the conflict of interest in every position level. The conflict of interest between those two matters will disturb objectivity, rationality, and professional work culture. Then, it slows the growth of institutional performance to achieve a common goal. The leadership tenure and constitutional organ require certain arrangements to prevent absolutism. Christopher Pierson states that:
Absolutism signaled the emergence of a form of state based upon: the absorption of smaller and weaker political units into larger and stronger political structures; a strengthened ability to rule over a unified territorial area; a tightened system of law and order enforced throughout a territory; the application of a 'more unitary, continuous, calculable and effective' rule by a single, sovereign head; and the development of a relatively small number of states engaged in an open-ended, competitive, and risk-laden power struggle. 
Questions
This paper will raise the issue related to the tenure of constitutional organ leader in the Indonesian constitutional system. First, how is the arrangement of leadership tenure in the constitutional organs according to the Indonesian legislation system. Then, how to adjust the arrangement of constitutional organ leader in order to provide legal certainty and prevent conflict that can disrupt organs' performance. According to legal experts' opinion, there are some characteristics of Indonesia as the law-state. Jimly Asshiddiqie suggests thirteen basic principles of law-state (Rechtsstaat), one of them is power limitation. 10 The power limitation is necessary because according to "the iron law" every power has a tendency to be arbitrary. It is in line with Lord Acton's opinion: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely". 11 Therefore, power must be limited by separating them into some branches which function as 'checks and balances' . Those branches balance and control each other as well as have an equal position. 12 The power limitation is also conducted by distributing the power into some organs arranged vertically.
II. DISCUSSION
Therefore, the power is not centralized and concentrated in one single organ allowing the arbitrariness. Furthermore, the elements of democratic state can be achieved if these conditions are available: (1) a responsible government, (2) house of representatives elected from the election conduct a free supervision, (3) the presence of several political parties, (4) the presence of independent press or media, and (5) a. Information: The extent to which participants are given access to reasonably accurate information that they believe to be relevant to the issue.
b. Substantive balance:
The extent to which arguments offered by one side or from one perspective are answered by considerations offered by those who hold other perspectives.
c. Diversity: The extent to which the major positions in the public are represented by participants in the discussion.
d. Conscientiousness:
The extent to which participants sincerely weigh the merits of the arguments.
e. Equal consideration:
The extent to which arguments offered by all participants are considered on the merits regardless of which participants offer them.
Moreover, the goal of democratic deliberation can be achieved by combining it with political equality, an idea in which everyone has an equal opportunity in every political choice. According to James S. Fishkin, the basic idea of political equality is every citizen has an equal possibility to support any alternative (candidate, party, or policy). Therefore, democratic system should give every citizen an equal probability to be voters determining the ones who will serve in important position.
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The recognition of political equality principle in democratic living has been acknowledged in Indonesian constitution, i.e. Article 28D (3) The Constitutional Court responds to this appeal that to provide the equality of rights for all citizens as guaranteed by Article 28D (1) and (3) 26 However, the equality of rights can be conducted by requiring the Regional Government Law adapts to new developments made by the law maker to give the right for every individual to run for regional head and deputy head as independent candidate as stipulated in Article 67 (2) of the Aceh Government Law.
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After knowing the importance of the arrangement of constitutional organ leadership tenure, this article will discuss the form of leadership tenure arrangement especially for constitutional organs categorized as primary constitutional organs. According to Asshiddiqie, there are more than 34 constitutional organs stated either directly or indirectly in the 1945 Constitution.
Those 34 organs can be distinguished from two aspects, i.e. functionality and hierarchy. 28 In term of the hierarchy, all 34 organs can be differentiated into three layers. The first layer is primary constitutional organs. The second layer is constitutional organs, while the third layer is regional organs. 
The arrangement of leadership tenure in primary constitutional organ that provides legal certainty.
Based on the four models of tenure arrangement in primary constitutional organs, i.e. regulated by the 1945 Constitution, regulated by law, not regulated by law but regulated in the internal regulation, and not regulated by law and also not regulated by internal regulation, it can be analyzed the degree of strength related to legal certainty. The first model, regulated through the Constitution,
is the most ideal model and gives the strongest tenure certainty. Then, it is followed by the second model, i.e. regulated by law.
The model of leadership tenure arrangement in primary constitutional organs stated in the Constitution is the most powerful model in term of legal certainty for several reasons. First, Constitution as the state constitution is the highest legal order according to Hans Kelsen. 48 Constitution is considered to be a "constituent act", and it is not an ordinary legislative act.
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Constitution is a higher law or even the highest and most fundamental law, because constitution is the source of legitimacy or the authorization for other legal forms or legislation. 50 The consequence of constitution as the highest hierarchy of legislation is in accordance with the universal legal principle. Thus, legislation under the constitution must not conflict with the higher law in order to be valid and enforced. Kelsen, op. cit., p. 157. 57 Dewa Gede Atmadja, Hukum Konstitusi, op. cit., p. 40. 58 Bagir Manan, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Konstitusi Suatu Negara, Bandung: Mandar Maju, 1995 , p. 7. 59 Dahlan Thaib, et. al., Teori Hukum dan Konstitusi, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada,1999 by Law. 61 Some provisions in the 1945 Constitution require further regulation through the Law although its implementation is not explained in the article of the Constitution in order to run the provision well.
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Regarding the third regulation model that is not arranged by the Law but it is arranged in the internal regulation, and the fourth model that is not arranged by the law as well as internal regulation are models with the low level of legal certainty. It happens for several reasons, first, the internal regulation such as MPR regulation, DPR regulation, and DPD regulation does not fulfill the qualification as legislation.
According to Bagir Manan, legislation is any written decision issued by an authorized official which contains rules or behaviors in general. 63 In addition, A.
Hamid S. Attamimi explains legislation is all laws created by constitutional organs in a certain form complemented by sanctions. It enforces and binds people. which reflects the representation of ten provinces and spread over three regions proportionally. Article 244(2) regulates in the event the amendment proposal is approved, the plenary session establishes a Special Committee to make the improvements. Article 244 (4) regulates the results of the discussion referred to paragraph (2) shall be submitted to the plenary session for making a decision.
III. CONCLUSION
The regulations about the tenure of constitutional organs leader required at least based on two considerations. The first consideration is, as the implementation it is easy to change the internal regulation by only have to fulfill the members minimal quorum (over one from the half of total members) can change the tenure of the leader anytime.
To prevent the conflicts among the member of primary constitutional organs and prevent an unnecessary turmoil which can interfere the authority exercise of the primary constitutional organs, we need to conduct a change to the primary constitutional organs tenure regulations so that it is not regulated by the primary constitutional organs internal regulations, but it should be regulated in the 1945
Constitution or at least in the Law (UU) in order to better ensuring the legal guarantee.
